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Abstract 
 With the proliferation of technology used to prate software, this paper answers some key 
questions in policy decision making. Dynamic panel Generalized Methods of Moments and 
Two Stage Least Squares are employed. IPRs laws (treaties) are instrumented with 
government quality dynamics to assess their incidence on software piracy. The following 
findings are established. (1) Government institutions are crucial in enforcing IPRs laws 
(treaties) in the fight against software piracy. (2) Main IP laws enacted by the legislature and 
Multilateral IP laws are most effective in combating piracy. (3) IPRs laws, WIPO Treaties and 
Bilateral Treaties do not have significant negative incidences on software piracy. Policy 
implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
 
 It is now an economic fact that for any country, region or continent to be actively 
engaged in the global economy, it must be competitive. Competition derives from intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) which protect intellectual capital. There has been a wide consensus on 
the key role IPRs protection play in promoting innovation processes and economic 
development. In recent history, technological progress has not only brought about an 
increased availability of information and technology related products, but also the 
proliferations of technology used to copy or pirate such commodities. Under the weight of 
these concerns, efforts are being placed on increasingly harmonizing the standards of IPRs 
protection worldwide. This harmonization is particularly important in developing countries, 
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since the proliferation of pirated goods is more pronounced in low-income countries (Moores 
& Esichaikul, 2011, 2). 
 The debate that has centered on IPRs protection has been animated by two schools of 
thought. While some scholars postulate that increased protection of IPRs stimulate economic 
growth and development through a favorable impact on factor productivity (Gould & Gruben, 
1996; Falvey et al., 2006), some skeptics are of the position that IPRs protection and 
adherence to international treaties (laws) may seriously limit the growth prospects of 
developing countries (Yang & Maskus, 2001). This second strand is of the stance that, less 
tight IPRs regimes are necessary (at least in the short-term) for developing countries to enable 
knowledge spillovers, crucial for growth and development. In line with their thinking, the 
existing technology in developing countries is more imitative and/or adaptive in nature and 
not suitable for the creation of new innovations
1
.   
 In light of the above debate, there is a growing interest in the impact of IPRs 
protection on the promotion of innovation, technological advancements and economic 
development. Whereas, theoretical literature has focused on the concerns to some extent, little 
scholarly attention has been devoted to empirical research. The bulk of empirical studies have 
concentrated on the socio-economic determinants of piracy in several copyright industries 
(Bezmen & Depken, 2004; Banerjee et al., 2005; Andrés, 2006; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; 
Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2009; Andrés & Goel, 2012).  However, with 
growing efforts currently being placed on harmonizing the standards of IPRs protection 
worldwide, policy makers should be eager to know which IPRs regimes are most effective in 
developing countries where the scourge of piracy is most acute
2
.  
                                                 
1
This school of thought  has gained prominence in the debate over  if ‘permission’ should be granted to enable 
‘copying’ of life-saving pharmaceuticals, especially those used in the management of HIV/AIDS in developing 
countries most affected and least likely to afford such treatments.  
2
Many studies have concluded that nations with higher income and greater individualism have lower piracy rates 
(Maskus & Penubarti, 1995; Gould & Gruben, 1996; Park & Ginarte, 1997; Rushing & Thompson, 1996, 1999; 
Husted, 2000; Marron & Steel, 2000; Kranenberg & Hogenbirk, 2003; Kim, 2004; Depken & Simmons, 2004). 
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Among developing nations, while regions like South America and Asia are responding 
in calculated steps that underscore IPRs in the current pursuit of national, regional and 
international initiatives, Africa appears to be lagging behind. In the current efforts towards 
harmonizing IPRs laws (treaties), policy makers in the continent are most likely to ask the 
following questions. (1) Which IPRs treaties (laws) are effective in fighting software piracy? 
(2) Are formal institutions really instrumental in upholding and enforcing IPRs treaties 
(laws)? (3) If so, for which IPRs laws (treaties) are government organs instrumental? (4) How 
are government institutions instrumental in the fight against piracy through IPRs laws 
(treaties)? The object of this study is to provide the much needed answers to these questions.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines existing literature. 
Data and methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 3. Section 4 covers 
the empirical analysis and corresponding discussion. We conclude with Section 5.   
 
2. Literature review 
 
 2.1 Institutional quality, software piracy and IPRs protection in Africa  
 
 There is mounting realization among international development experts that 
development requires above all, governance quality (Kaliannan et al., 2010; Rasiah, 2011; 
Katz & Iizuka, 2011). While the issue of institutional quality has been substantially 
documented in recent development literature (Asongu, 2011; Asongu, 2012abc), how it plays 
out in the fight against piracy (by upholding IPRs against software piracy) has received little 
or no scholarly attention. In fact, software piracy has reached an epidemic threshold in Africa 
(Hamade, 2006; El-Bialy, 2010). Consistent with the Business Software Alliance Global 
Software Piracy Study (BSA, 2010)
3
, software piracy in Africa is double the global rate. 
According to the report of this alliance, the commercial value of unlicensed software installed 
on personal computers (PCs) in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), which excludes South 
                                                 
3
The BSA evaluates the state of software piracy around the world. 
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Africa reached $109 million in 2010 as 83 % of software installed on PCs during the year was 
pirated. Having soared by 3.6 points on the previous five year average, this stands at almost 
double the global piracy rate for PC software (that is 42 %). In effect, the role of governance 
and formal institutions have been substantially documented as a means of effectively tackling 
the rising phenomenon (IDC, 2009; El-Bialy, 2010; Blakeney and Mengistie, 2011; Fripp, 
2011; AFROL, 2012; Agabi, 2012). This section will be discussed in two strands. Whereas 
the first presents glaring evidence on software piracy from selected African countries in the 
dataset, the second focuses on institutional measures that are being implemented to combat 
the growing phenomenon.  
With regard to the growing importance of piracy in Africa, Egypt, Kenya and Nigeria 
best illustrate the situation. Firstly, it is reported that software developers are losing millions 
of naira annually to software thefts and the phenomenon of software piracy is negatively 
affecting Nigeria’s economy (Agabi, 2012). Agabi confirms from business experts that, the 
problem of illegal software usage in the country is a serious one and finding a solution is 
likely to become even more urgent with the usage rate expected to increase over the coming 
years.  Secondly, the Kenya Copyright Board is currently increasing its efforts in the battle 
against the piracy of software. According to Fripp (2011), it was to battle it with vigor as of 
2012 in order to increase investment potential and crackdown on illegal use of software. Fripp 
emphasizes that according to the board, there have been sustained raids on suspected resellers 
of counterfeit software, in order to reduce the Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) sector’s losses which is losing thousands of new jobs and millions of dollars as a result 
of the piracy. Consistent with the Executive Director of the Board, there are clear signs that 
the Board has resolved to uphold (and strengthen) Kenya’s IPRs laws/treaties/regimes by 
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firmly dealing with those that are engaged in software piracy
4
. Thirdly, a study by the 
International Data Corporation (IDC) Global Software Piracy has shown that Egypt is making 
substantial efforts to tackle the issue of piracy. It is also highlighted that, this is largely due to 
the improved collaboration between Egypt and the US on enforcement of IPRs cases 
(AFROL, 2012). Consistent with this AFROL report, Egypt is fully committed to further 
reducing its piracy rating  and tackling the challenges facing the industry with a number of 
measures; among others, IPRs training for the Egyptian legal community and promotion of 
the copyright law (to improve awareness of IPRs and its role in sustaining economic growth 
and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI)).  
  We devote space in the second strand to discussing the role of institutions in IPRs 
protection and reduction of software piracy. Firstly, with regard to IPRs protection, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) can be considered among the different multilateral organizations 
that are emphasizing on the importance of legal reforms in African countries. These 
organizations guide these countries in the granting and protection of IPRs by providing 
minimum requirement standards that should be fulfilled by each member country. However, a 
draw-back to this approach is that, their strategy is mainly based on promoting one-fits-all 
institutions. Therefore, they seem to neglect (or ignore) alternative institutional arrangements 
that could be used to reach efficient outcomes for the conflicting parties for a long time (El-
Bialy, 2010) or how institutions matter in upholding IPRs (as the present paper seeks to 
address). Accordingly, El-Bialy goes further to assert that the phenomenon of inefficient IPRs 
institutions is more likely to be significant in developing countries. This is because they may 
need “appropriate” IPRs enforcement strategies and, their institutions differ considerably from 
those prevailing in wealthier countries. For example, Rodrik (2008) has qualified them as 
‘second-best institutions’ and described the institutional reforms promoted by multilateral 
                                                 
4
 “The Board remains ready and willing to support software copyright owners by intensifying enforcement 
efforts to reduce software piracy in our country and ensure that legitimate businesses reap the fruits of their 
labor as per the Kenya Copyright Board mandate” (Fripp, 2011).  
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organizations (the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) or WTO) as being 
heavily skewed towards a best-practice approach.  
Secondly (with regard to the role of institutions in software piracy), during the end of 
the 20
th
 century, the world began tilting toward new IPR strategies, with much emphasis 
placed on the need  for cooperative policies to reduce software piracy. Governments, together 
with software companies (the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) and the BSA) 
started doing more to tackle piracy in Africa. The BSA started publishing an annual study 
(after the year 2000) to assess a detailed and diverse picture of global software piracy in order 
to analyze country- and regional-specific piracy trends (El-Bialy, 2010). It began to look for 
alternative ways of tackling piracy. In addition to conducting huge awareness campaigns to 
the public, agreements between the BSA and African governments were signed to provide 
price cut-offs of original software products. To this effect, some satisfactory results were 
observed
5
. Over the past few years however, reforming ‘IPR enforcement organs’ in 
developing countries has been the object of much attention. Accordingly, the efficiency of the 
enforcement authorities or the process of factual (de facto) enforcement is now acknowledged 
as an important orientation of modern IPRs policies (El-Bialy, 2010).  
 
2.2 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and development 
 
According to Bezmen & Depken (2004), there are two principal avenues along which 
intellectual property (IP) and the strength of IPRs regimes are thought to affect the level of 
economic growth and development. The first strand provides analysis of the extent to which 
IPRs influence the creation of new knowledge and information within nations, as well as the 
diffusion of existing knowledge across countries. The second strand is concerned with the 
indirect effect of a nation’s IPRs regime on international transactions that provide factors 
imperative to the growth process.  
                                                 
5
 For instance, some considerable achievements were noticed as piracy trends started to decline in North Africa.  
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 In the first strand on ‘creation and dissemination of information’, IPRs protection 
could be traced to the foundation of endogenous theories of economic growth whereby, 
investment in research and development (R&D) rewards individual investors with profit 
(returns) and also augment society’s stock of knowledge. Lowering the cost of future 
innovation, improves the accumulation of knowledge for economic growth (Romer, 1990; 
Grossman & Helpman, 1991). The underlying wisdom of tighter and restrictive IPRs regimes 
is based on the notion that, protection of IPRs serves as a stimulus to growth by encouraging 
inventions and innovations. Recently, many newly industrialized countries have campaigned 
for stronger IPRs via bilateral, multilateral and regional arrangements. This difference in 
approach could be traced to the desire of developing countries to specialize in labor intensive 
production in agricultural industries. Until much recently, these industries have largely been 
supported by public expenditures on research and technology and have greatly benefited from 
shared knowledge spillovers.  
 In the second strand, IPRs may also influence a nation’s growth and development 
process via their influence on the nation’s ability to engage in international transactions such 
as trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows and technology transfers (Bezmen & Depken, 
2004).  The endogenous growth theories have presented international trade as an important 
stimulus to economic prosperity, since access to world markets could stimulate greater 
utilization of human resources (Todaro & Smith, 2003), and ease the transmission of 
technology by providing contact with foreign counterparts and direction of domestic resources 
towards more research intensive sectors. Nevertheless, these models do not necessarily predict 
that openness leads to economic growth for all countries and under all circumstances; 
principally because theoretical prediction is contingent on country-specific conditions. It has 
been substantially documented that a stronger IPRs regime is a crucial factor in attracting the 
inflows of FDI and technological transfers (Lee & Mansfield, 1996), stimulating exports 
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(Maskus & Penubarti, 1995) and increasing the possibility of investment undertaken by 
multinational enterprises (Mansfield, 1994; Seyoum, 1996). From the other side of the coin, 
stronger IPRs protection could mitigate the need for FDI (Yang & Maskus, 2001). 
 
2.3 The politics of piracy and intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection 
 
Consistent with Shadlen et al. (2003), two of the main forms of IPRs are copyrights 
and patents. Copyright protects form of expression (e.g. written material and artistic works), 
whereas patents protect underlying ideas used for industrial products or processes. Where 
computer software receives protection, it is ordinary under copyright law, though in recent 
years software developers (particularly in the USA) have also been granted patent protection. 
When the government fails to enforce copyrights and patents, the processes of artistic creation 
and invention may take on a character of public goods and hence be subject to traditional 
collective action issues. IPRs are designed to solve a ‘collective action concern’ by offering 
inventors and authors temporary monopolies or in the jargon of public choice theory, selective 
incentives to pursue their vocations. Ultimately, patents and copyrights should be rewarding 
to producers of IP. In the same line of thinking, strengthened IPRs maybe unappealing to 
consumers who are likely to face exorbitant prices on protected commodities. 
As concerns IPRs, managing the trade-offs between consumers and producers is 
particularly complex. The complexities are derived from the characteristics of expression and 
ideas as distinct types of goods and services. IPRs are different from normal property rights 
from the perspective that, they are different from tangible goods. Most importantly, ideas are 
not rival-oriented in consumption and non-excludable, implying that an unlimited number of 
people can exploit the same idea simultaneously and repeated use does not deplete (diminish) 
the stock of the idea. Owing to these distinct characteristics, many of the standard rationales 
for giving property owners extensive rights to control the use of their commodities go by the 
wayside. Factually, without proper motivations to producers, ideas like tangible goods run the 
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risk of being undersupplied. However, it is not necessary for example to endow owners with 
strong rights to control distribution and restrict use so as to prevent depletion of commodities 
that by their definition are non-excludable. Conversely, restricting-use could freeze ideas and 
stifle innovation. Indeed, a substantial body of the literature warns of the dangers of too much 
protection of IPRs (Yang & Maskus, 2001). For instance, stronger IPRs may stifle incentives 
to innovate and introduce new technologies (Helpman, 1993; Bessen & Maskin, 2000; 
Maskus, 2000; Shadlen et al., 2003). As sustained by Shadlen et al. (2003), with too much 
protection, the tragedy of the commons may be substituted by the tragedy of the anti-commons 
(Heller & Eisenberg, 1998), since diminished access to upstream ideas can stifle downstream 
innovation. Hence, the challenge for the management of IPRs is to create incentives for 
provision which do not unnecessarily deter the distribution.  
To strike the delicate balance between provision and distribution, IPRs have been 
curtailed historically. For example, private rights over ideas are not conferred upon possession 
automatically. Nor are rights indefinite: copyrights and patents expire, after which what is 
private property enters into the public domain. Private property rights are also limited in the 
view of being subject to a range of automatic exceptions. That is, third parties also have rights 
to use ideas and commodities protected by IPRs. In the case of copyrights, these rights fall 
under the doctrine of fair-use which permits third parties to exploit copyrighted material 
regardless of the intent of the copyright owner. Before the 1980s, most governments 
throughout the world offered porous and weak copyright protection, precisely to motivate 
diffusion and use (Lessig, 2001, p. 249). IPRs protection systems introduced in 1980s 
fundamental changes to overcome the limitations that traditionally distinguished the treatment 
of intellectual property from tangible property (May, 2000; Shadlen et al., 2003). From a 
software piracy standpoint, in addition to making copyrights easier to obtain by simplifying 
the process of registration, the current arrangement enables copyright owners with 
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significantly greater control and exclusion rights; implying third parties’ rights to fair use 
have been significantly reduced (Shadlen et al., 2003, p. 9). This represents a substantial 
challenge for government to enforce international treaties (laws) on IPRs protection in a bid to 
curb the growing phenomenon of piracy.  
Shadlen et al. (2003) further postulate that, by granting extensive periods of protection 
to patents and copyrights, IPRs are made effectively permanent. By the time most operating 
systems or applications fall into the public domain, it is unlikely that any machine on earth 
will be able to use them (Lessig, 2001, p. 252). This implies, the sea of variations include 
introduction of software under copyright law, significantly greater scope of protection for 
copyright owners and longer protection periods. At the national level (beside the 
extraordinary trade-off between innovation and diminished diffusion of new commodities), a 
concern arises on how to enforce IPRs and fight piracy. This paper seeks to solve this puzzle 
by examining which IPRs treaties (laws) matter for the battle against piracy in Africa.  
 
2.4 Scope and positioning of the paper 
 
 With recent developments in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), 
the concern over software piracy is increasingly relevant and, has retained scholarly attention. 
International organizations are currently advocating global convergence in IPRs as a 
prerequisite for successful innovation strategies. The difficulties of achieving such 
harmonization are however evident from the attempts of several nations to develop divergent 
IPRs systems. Standard-setting is increasingly important in tackling software piracy as a 
means of reducing transaction cost. Standards also have a particularly important role of 
ensuring compatibility and interconnectivity of products and services. 
A substantial part of the literature has examined the determinants of the ability to 
pirate software by investigating the socio-economic factors that affect piracy. Strong 
conclusions have been drawn that nations with higher income and greater individualism have 
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lower piracy rates (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995; Gould & Gruben, 1996; Rushing & 
Thompson, 1996, 1999; Park & Ginarte, 1997; Husted, 2000; Marron & Steel, 2000; 
Kranenberg & Hogenbirk, 2003; Kim, 2004; Depken & Simmons, 2004). A vast empirical 
literature has also concentrated on the socio-economic determinants of piracy rates in several 
copyright industries (Andrés, 2006; Banerjee et al., 2005; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; Peitz & 
Waelbroeck, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2009; Andrés & Goel, 2012). To a great extent, the above 
studies have concentrated on developed countries and the emerging economies of Latin 
America and East Asia. The focus of the present study on the sparsely represented African 
continent in the literature also draws from the debate on the ‘East Asian Miracle’6.  
Europe and North America have mastered the dynamics of IP and inexorably driving 
developments in the global and international arena. Other regions like Asia and South 
America are responding in calculated steps that underscore the role of IP in the current pursuit 
of national, regional and international initiatives. Consequently, different nations have varying 
standards of protection of IPRs. The recent trend of globalization strengthened by several 
multilateral and regional treaties further creates some international minimum standard for 
IPRs protection.  In Africa, IPRs issues are assuming central stage in discussions on 
development of the continent. Given the growing role of IPRs in software piracy protection, 
policy makers are more likely today to ask the questions we have discussed in the introduction 
of this paper. Hence, the empirical section will provide some answers.   
 
                                                 
6
Additional evidence for the possibility that the changing strength of IPRs regimes is based on a nation’s level of 
development or current technological ability could be traced to the rapid growth witnessed by South-East Asia. 
Some evidence suggests that the ‘East Asian Miracle’ might have originated from weaker IPRs regimes at the 
early stages of these nations’ development in addition to their accumulation of capital. These nations’ capacity to 
absorb, replicate and duplicate foreign innovations might have contributed to their relatively high economic 
prosperity rates. Further evidence has suggested that, as these countries became significant producers of new 
technologies and innovations, their IPRs regimes tightened and became stricter. While Nelson & Pack (1999) 
have postulated that the productive assimilation of existing (foreign) production techniques and technologies 
‘was a critical component in the success of these countries’, Maskus (2000) cautions that weaker protection of 
IPRs may not necessarily be beneficial for developing countries as it may cause them to remain subservient to 
older and less efficient outdated technologies.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
3.1.1 Measuring piracy  
 
The proxy for piracy is the software piracy rate, which is defined as “the unauthorized 
copying of computer software which constitutes copyright infringement for either commercial 
or personal use” (SIIA, 2000). Software piracy is multidimensional and could potentially take 
many avenues – e.g., organized copiers, piracy by individuals and commercial or business 
piracy. Consistent with the Business Software Alliance (BSA), we can distinguish among 
three types of piracy: 1) end user copying; 2) downloading; and 3) counterfeiting. Hence, 
obtaining an accurate measure of the prevalence of software piracy remains a substantial 
challenge in the literature. The piracy level is computed as the difference in demand for new 
software applications (estimated from PC shipments) and the legal supply of software. In the 
present paper, the measure of piracy employed is the percentage of software (primarily 
business software) in a country that is illegally installed (without a license) on an annual basis 
and is taken to capture the level of software piracy. This variable is reported in percentages, 
scaling from 0 % (or no piracy) to 100 % (i.e., all software installed is of pirated origin). 
Piracy rates are gathered from the Business Software Alliance (BSA, 2007). Additional 
details on measurement can be obtained from BSA (2009)
7
.  BSA is an industry group; 
nonetheless its data on software piracy is the best cross-country indicator currently used in the 
literature, though the object of some inherent upward bias
8
. From a broad perspective, the data 
on software piracy could be seen as proxying for the extent of digital piracy.  The rate of 
software piracy is computed as: ‘logarithm of (piracy/(100-piracy))’ to ensure comparability 
of the variables.  
                                                 
7
 Data from the BSA primarily measures the piracy of commercial software.  More discussion on the reliability 
of piracy data could be obtained from Png (2008) and Traphagan & Griffith (1998).  
8
This data has been extensively used in the piracy literature (Marron & Steel, 2000; Banerjee et al., 2005; 
Andrés, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2009).  
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3.1.2 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) variables  
 
 IPRs variables are gathered from the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO). The five exogenous variables gathered include: Main IP laws, IPRs laws, WIPO 
Treaties, Multilateral Treaties and Bilateral Treaties. Main IP laws and IPRs laws are IP laws 
that are enacted by the legislature and enforced by the institutions. WIPO administered 
treaties are defined from the day they enter into force for the contracting party. IP relevant 
Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties are also gathered with respect to the date they are enforced 
by the contracting parties.  The primary purpose of these laws is to uphold IPRs. Hence, they 
are naturally exogenous to software piracy if properly instrumented with existing enforcement 
organs (formal institutions).  
 
3.1.3 Instrumental variables  
 
In this section, we devote space to providing justification for the empirical validity of 
the instrumental variables. This justification is essential for the relevance of the empirical 
analysis because a theoretical basis for the instruments is crucial for sound and consistent 
interpretation of estimated coefficients. In other words, while the object of this paper is to 
assess the effect of IPRs laws (treaties) on piracy, it also indirectly aims to examine how 
government institutions are instrumental in the incidence of IPRs laws (treaties) on piracy. 
The instrumental variable approach in the empirical section requires that the instruments be 
correlated with the main endogenous regressor. Logic and common-sense have it that, 
government institutions and IPRs move hand in hand. Save in utopia, we cannot discuss one 
while ignoring the other. Hence, only formal institutions set by the governments in place 
enforce IPRs laws (treaties). Measures indicating the quality of formal institutions include: the 
rule of law, regulation quality, corruption-control, government effectiveness, political 
stability (no violence) and voice & accountability. We argue that, these good governance 
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indicators are instruments for the upholding and enforcement of IPRs laws (treaties). Details 
on the definitions of these variables are provided in Appendix 3.  Government quality 
indicators range from -2.5 to 2.5 and the negative values in Appendix 1 confirm the poor state 
of formal institutions in the sampled African countries.  
Owing to constraints in data availability (for piracy), the dataset includes annual 
observations for 11 African countries for the years 2000-2010. Details about the variable 
definitions (with data sources), descriptive statistics (with presentation of countries) and 
correlation analysis (showing the basic correlations between key variables used in this paper) 
are reported in the appendices.  The summary statistics (Appendix 1) of the variables used in 
the panel regressions show that, there is quite a degree of variation in the data utilized so that 
one should be confident that reasonable estimated relationships should emerge. The purpose 
of the correlation matrix (Appendix 2) is to mitigate issues resulting from overparametization 
and multicolinearity.  Based on the correlation coefficients, there do not appear to be any 
serious issues in terms of the relationships to be estimated. The countries investigated are 
presented in Panel B of Appendix 1.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Dynamic panel Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) 
 
Estimation with dynamic panel data has some important advantages and one 
disadvantage when compared to cross-country analysis (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008). On 
the first positive note: (1) it makes use both of time-series and the cross sectional variations in 
the data; (2) in cross-country regressions, the unobserved country-specific effect is part of the 
error term, so that correlation between the error term and the exogenous variables results in 
biased estimated coefficients. More so, in cross-country regressions, if the lagged dependent 
variable is included among the explanatory variables, the country-specific effect is certainly 
correlated with the regressors. A means of controlling for the presence of the unobserved 
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country-specific effect is to first-difference the regression equation to eliminate the country-
specific effect, and then employ instrumental variables to control for endogeneity. The 
endogeneity issue is the second edge of dynamic panel data analysis. Uncontrolled 
endogeneity can substantially bias estimates and lead to misleading inferences. Dynamic 
panel data analysis takes care of this endogeneity issue by using lagged values of exogenous 
variables as instruments.  
 The principal concern associated with dynamic panel data analysis is using data-
averages over shorter time spans. This implies the estimated results reveal shorter-run impacts 
and not long-term effects, which should be kept in mind when interpreting and discussing 
results. In the context our paper, we shall overcome this issue by using both ‘full data’ and 
‘data averages’.  
 The dynamic panel regression model is expressed as follows: 
tititititititititi BilatMultiWIPOIPRMIPPP ,,6,5,4,3,21,10,           (1) 
              
 Where ‘t’ stands for the period and ‘i’ represents a country. P  is the piracy rate; MIP, 
Main Intellectual Property law; IPR, Intellectual Property Rights law; WIPO, World 
Intellectual Property Organization Treaties; Multi, Multilateral Treaties; Bilat , Bilateral 
Treaties,  i  is a country-specific effect,  t  is a time-specific constant and  ti ,  an error 
term.  
 Estimates will be unbiased if and only if, the IPRs exogenous variables above are 
strictly exogenous. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the real world because: (1) while they 
have a substantial incidence on piracy, the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out because the level 
of piracy could also affect the choice of IPRs regimes; (2)  the regressors could be correlated 
with the error term ( ti , ) and; (3) country- and time-specific effects could also be correlated 
with other variables in the model, which is often the case with lagged dependent variables 
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included in the equations.  Hence, an issue of endogeneity due to endogenous regressors.  A 
way of dealing with the problem of the correlation between the individual specific-effect and 
the lagged endogenous variables involves eliminating the individual effect by first 
differencing. Thus, Eq. (1) becomes: 
)()()()( 1,,41,,31,,22,1,11,,   titititititititititi WIPOWIPOIPRIPRMIPMIPPPPP    
 
                   )()()()( 1,,11,,61,,5   tititttitititi BilatBilatMultiMulti        (2) 
 
However Eq. (2) presents another issue; estimation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
is still bias because there remains a correlation between the lagged endogenous independent 
variable and the disturbance term. To address this concern, we estimate the regression in 
differences jointly with the regression in levels using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation. The procedure uses lagged levels of the regressors as instruments in the 
difference equation, and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments in the levels 
equation, thus exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged dependent 
variables and the error term. Between the difference GMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 
1991) and system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998), we 
choose the latter in accordance with Bond et al. (2001, 3-4)
9
.  
In specifying the dynamic panel system estimation, we opt for the two-step GMM 
because it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity. In the first-step, the residuals are 
considered to be homoscedastic. The assumption of no auto-correlation in the residuals is 
crucial as past lagged variables are to be used as instruments for the endogenous variable. 
Also, the estimation depends on the hypothesis that the lagged values of the dependent 
variable and other independent variables are valid instruments in the regression. When the 
                                                 
9
 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the 
initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been 
shown to perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially 
consistent with standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our 
empirical application. Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent 
empirical growth research”. Bond et al. (2001, pp.3-4).  
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error terms of the level equation are not auto-correlated, the first-order auto-correlation of the 
differenced residuals should be significant while their second-order auto-correlation: AR(2) 
should not be. The validity of the instruments is assessed with the Sargan over-identifying 
restrictions (OIR) test. In summary, the main arguments for using the system GMM 
estimation are that: it does not eliminate cross-country variation, it mitigates potential biases 
of the difference estimator in small samples and, it can control for the potential endogeneity 
of all regressors. 
 
3.2.2 Two-stage least squares 
 
In accordance with recent piracy literature (Andrés & Goel, 2012), the paper adopts a 
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation technique. IV 
estimation solves the puzzle of endogeneity and hence, avoids the inconsistency of estimated 
coefficients by OLS when the exogenous variables are correlated with the error term in the 
main equation. The 2SLS estimation will entail the following steps: 
First-stage regression:  
 
 itiit sInstrumentIP )(10  it                       (1)             
                               
                                                                  
Second-stage regression: 
 
 itit IPPiracy )(10   it                          (2)                                                                                        
 
In the first and second equations, it   and it  respectively represent the error terms. 
Instrumental variables are: control of corruption, government effectiveness, voice & 
accountability, rule of law, regulation quality and political stability. IP represents: Main 
Intellectual Property Law, Intellectual Property Rights Law, WIPO Treaties, Multilateral 
Treaties and Bilateral Treaties. Piracy is the software piracy rate.  
We adopt the following steps in the IV analysis: (1) justify the choice of a 2SLS over 
an OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (2) verify the 
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instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of the explaining variable (IPRs 
channels) and; (3) ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in 
the main equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test.  
 
3.2.3 Further Robustness checks 
  
Beside the control for endogeneity, further robustness of our models is ensured by the 
following: (1) use of ‘full data’ and ‘average data’ with non-overlapping intervals to capture 
both the long-term and short-run tendencies of estimated coefficients respectively; (2) 
employment of robust Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard 
errors; (3) use of both system and difference GMM estimation, and; (4) employment of both 
GMM instruments (for dynamic panel regressions) and 2SLS with ‘government quality’ 
instruments (based on common sense and discretion of the authors).  
 
4. Empirical analysis  
 
4.1 Presentation of results, discussion and policy implications   
 
The section seeks to address the four main issues highlighted in the introductory 
section
10
. While the GMM estimations address the first issue, the 2SLS estimations assess all 
four concerns. However, the GMM estimations are necessary (from a comparative 
standpoint), to enable the 2SLS approach address the second, third and fourth issues. This is 
because, the validity of the government quality instruments in the 2SLS approach need to be 
compared with other valid instruments.  
From the results in Table 1, the difference GMM findings are substantially different 
from those of the system GMM. Hence, we shall give priority to system GMM estimators for 
reasons already outlined above in the methodology section (Bond et al., 2001). For both types 
                                                 
10
 (1) Which IPRs treaties (laws) are effective in fighting software piracy? (2) Are formal institutions really 
instrumental in upholding and enforcing IPRs treaties (laws)? (3) If so, for which IPRs laws (treaties) are 
government organs instrumental? (4) How are government institutions instrumental in the fight against piracy 
through IPRs laws (treaties)? 
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of GMMs all the null hypotheses of the AR(2) and Sargan-OIR tests for no autocorrelation 
and validity of instruments respectively are not rejected. For the 2SLS, we perform a 
Hausman test prior to the IV estimations. The null hypothesis of the test is the position that, 
OLS estimates are consistent and efficient. Hence, a rejection of the null points to the issue of 
endogeneity and lends credit to the choice of an IV approach and corollarily justifies the 
GMM estimations. The null hypotheses of the Sargan-OIR tests are also rejected in all the 
2SLS models, confirming the validity of the government quality instrumental variables.  The 
absence of a significant initial piracy coefficient (Pit-1) in “full data” is not an issue because 
the two-Year NOI have been used to mitigate short-run disturbances looming in ‘full data’11. 
Two years average data with NOI captures only the short-run tendencies. Full data captures 
the long-term tendencies. Two justifications could be provided to account for this difference: 
(1) it is standard GMM estimation inference (as discussed in the methodology section) and; 
(2) it is consistent with recent methodological innovations in the convergence literature 
(Asongu, 2012defgh). Moreover, when ‘full data’ is converted into two year averages, it is a 
means of mitigating short-term disturbances that may loom substantially large and bias the 
estimated coefficients. 
 Based on the findings, the following could be established. (1) From GMM estimates, 
IPRs laws (treaties) mitigate piracy more in the long-term than in the short-run. While two-
year non-overlapping interval results are interpreted as short-run effects, ‘full data’ results 
have long-term incidences. (2) On the first question of which IPRs treaties (laws) are effective 
in fighting software piracy, only  Main IP laws and Multilateral treaties are found to have a 
significant negative effect. (3) On the second concern of assessing if formal institutions are 
instrumental in upholding and enforcing IPRs treaties, the answer is: yes, since government 
                                                 
11
 The absence of significant initial piracy coefficients (Pit-1) is simply an indication that the process of 
convergence cannot be fully appreciated with “full data” because short-term disturbances are looming 
substantially large (See, Islam, 1995, p. 14). This is the reason, the two-year NOI have been used to mitigate 
such short-term disturbances. 
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quality institutions are overwhelmingly valid by virtue of the Sargan-OIR test. In other words, 
failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan-OIR test suggests that, the government 
quality instruments do not control piracy beyond IPRs laws (treaties) channels. Simply put, 
these IPRs mechanisms are the only channels via which government quality dynamics (of 
corruption-control, rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, political stability 
(no violence), voice & accountability) fight piracy. (4) As regards the concern for which IPRs 
laws (treaties) are government organs instrumental, the answer is same as that to the first 
question. This is because; there are no additional significant IPRs channels estimates in the 
2SLS, compared to the GMM. (5) On the question of how government institutions are 
instrumental, two interpretations are necessary. On the one hand, in short-term (two-year 
NOI) and long-run (full data), formal institutions increase the efficacy of Main IP laws and 
Multilateral treaties
12
. On the other hand, in the absence of formal institutions, the efficacy of 
Main IP law seems to be greater than that of Multilateral treaties
13
. (6) The remaining IPRs 
laws (treaties) overwhelmingly have the right signs but are not significant. In other words, 
WIPO and Bilateral treaties do not have significant negative signs. A possible explanation to 
these unexpected results could be the fact that, these IP treaties do not directly target software 
piracy because they are either too general (WIPO Treaties) or too specific (Bilateral Treaties). 
Also, their variations in the summary statistics (in Appendix 1) that are significantly lower 
than those of other IP law variables could be the source of the insignificance. (7) A higher 
constant (autonomous) piracy rate in the 2SLS regressions (in comparison to GMM 
estimations) broadly indicates that other institutional organs need to be taken into account in 
the fight against piracy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Note should be taken of the fact that, formal institutions are the instruments in the 2SLS approach.  
13
The efficacy of Main IP laws and Multilateral Treaties is almost equal in the 2SLS approach. However, this is 
not the case in the GMM.  
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Table 1: GMM and 2SLS Regressions   
 Dependent variable: Piracy rate 
 GMM Estimations Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
 Full Data Two Year NOI Full Data Two Year NOI 
 Dif. GMM Sys. GMM Dif. GMM Sys. GMM Not  HAC HAC SE Not  HAC HAC SE 
Constant  0.008 0.791** 0.003 0.432* 1.88*** 1.88** 1.971** 1.971* 
 (0.529) (2.505) (0.089) (1.701) (2.871) (1.982) (2.093) (1.883) 
Initial Piracy  0.265 0.107 0.324** 0.491** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.715) (0.306) (1.977) (2.195)     
Main IP law -0.035 -0.080*** 0.222** -0.045* -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.097** -0.097*** 
 (-0.745) (-2.707) (2.053) (-1.959) (-3.280) (-3.044) (-2.434) (-2.694) 
IPRs law -0.0004 0.020 -0.034 0.010 -0.11* -0.119 -0.124 -0.124 
 (-0.011) (1.453) (-1.593) (1.059) (-1.760) (-1.125) (-1.187) (-1.024) 
WIPO Treaties  -0.041 -0.007 0.0004 0.014 -0.08 -0.089 -0.096 -0.096 
 (-0.963) (-0.145) (0.005) (0.448) (-0.548) (-0.422) (-0.429) (-0.429) 
Multilat. Treaties -0.014 -0.022* -0.015 -0.017* -0.09*** -0.099* -0.107** -0.107* 
 (-1.030) (-1.654) (-0.570) (-1.652) (-3.01) (-1.761) (-2.179) (-1.875) 
Bilateral Treaties  -0.063 -0.012 -0.057 0.017 0.293* 0.293 0.313 0.313 
 (-0.978) (-0.200) (-1.144) (0.435) (1.777) (0.989) (1.180) (0.950) 
         
Hausman test  --- --- --- --- 235.67*** 235.67*** 135.79*** 135.79*** 
         
AR(2)  -0.941 -1.501 1.092 0.834 --- --- --- --- 
 [0.346 ] [0.133 ] [ 0.274] [0.404 ]     
Sargan  OIR test  6.257 5.576 7.125 4.863 0.880 0.880 0.603 0.603 
 [1.000 ] [1.000 ] [0.624 ] [0.978 ] [0.348 ] [0.348 ] [0.437 ] [0.437 ] 
Wald (joint) test 5.984 724.01*** 50.939*** 499.2*** --- --- --- --- 
Adjusted R² --- --- --- --- 0.149 0.149 0.078 0.078 
Fisher  --- --- --- --- 4.561*** 3.174** 2.236* 2.947** 
         
Countries  11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Observations  84 95 34 45 90 90 50 50 
         
Instruments  51 60 16 20 Constant; CC; GE; RL; RQ; PolS; V&A 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]:P-values. Initial piracy: estimated lagged 
endogenous variable (piracy rate). Dif: Difference. Sys: System. GMM: Generalized Methods of Moments.  HAC: Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent. SE: Standard Errors. NOI: Non overlapping intervals. Main IP: Main Intellectual Property.  IPRs: Intellectual 
Property Rights.  WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization. Multilat: Multilateral. OIR: Overidentifying restrictions. CC: Control of 
Corruption. GE: Government Effectiveness. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality. PolS: Political Stability. V&A: Voice & 
Accountability.  
 
 We have observed that formal institutions are instrumental in upholding and enforcing 
IPRs treaties. Given the substantially documented evidence on poor institutions in most 
countries making-up the sample, there is reason to believe that, improving good governance 
would: (1) mitigate the negative incidence of  software piracy on the Nigerian economy and 
decrease the corresponding millions of naira in annual loses to software theft (Agabi, 2012); 
slow down the Kenyan ICT sector losses in thousands of new jobs and millions of dollars as 
well as improve on the country’s investment potential and climate (Fripp, 2011) and; (3) 
sustain economic growth and attract FDI in Egypt (AFROL, 2012).  
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 Another interesting finding worth laying emphasis on is the fact that based on GMM 
estimates; IPR laws (treaties) mitigate piracy more in the long-term than in the short-run. It 
points to the time advantage of IP laws. This implies governments of sampled countries 
should begin working toward balanced and appropriate IPRs protection at industrial and 
individual levels if they are to reap the time-oriented benefits of IPRs policies.  Among others, 
it will be effective not only for governments to negotiate with one another, but also for 
interactions of government and organizations to be informed on the opinion of the software 
industry. The imperative for the inclusions of other organs is justified by the higher 
autonomous or constant piracy rate in the 2SLS regressions. We suggest the following points 
in order to facilitate this harmonization process.  (1) The establishment of highly transparent 
international protection rules/regulations and greater efficiency in international rights 
acquisition among countries that are conducive to smooth trade, foreign investment and 
technology transfer. (2) Adequate and global protections for patents are imperative for the use 
of technological innovation geared toward a new society that takes African geographic 
universality of networks into consideration. (3) Development of an attractive international 
business environment that respects IPRs, with the global development of a business 
marketplace (among African countries as well as the rest of the world) that ensures the 
efficient use of IPRs, licensing contracts subject to ‘African development oriented 
regulations’ and, fair competition will improve investment and technology transfer as well as 
contribute to a harmonious development of the African economy.  
 
4.2 Caveats and future research direction 
 
The principal caveat is on the measurement of software piracy from which three points 
are relevant. (1) ‘Piracy rate is computed as the difference in demand for new software 
applications (computed from PC shipments) and the legal supply of software’. However, it 
should be noted that this metric defines piracy as the drop in demand of software products. 
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Hence, all pirated copies constitute lost sales. (2) It has also been substantially documented 
that, those who buy pirate copies do not always have the money to buy the true commodity. 
Hence, to consider the use of pirated products as diminishing demand for originals could be 
some kind of overstatement. (3) Knowledge of the elasticity of demand for the original 
product is necessary before the use of the metric. Otherwise, there will be a comparison of 
pirated commodities that constitute loss in sales with ones that do not. Hence, there is some 
upward bias in the software piracy estimate.  
An interesting future research direction could be assessing why some IPRs laws are 
not so significant in the battle against software piracy.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
It is now an economic fact that for any country, region or continent to be actively 
involved in the global economy, it must be competitive. Competition derives from intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) which protect intellectual capital. In the current efforts towards 
harmonizing IPRs laws (treaties) in Africa, this paper has answered four key questions policy 
makers need to know. On the first question of which IPRs treaties (laws) are effective in 
fighting software piracy, only Main IP laws and Multilateral treaties are found to have a 
significant negative effect. Concerning the second issue of assessing if formal institutions are 
instrumental in upholding and enforcing IPRs treaties, the answer is: yes. As regards to third 
concern of,  for which IPRs laws (treaties) are government organs instrumental, the answer is 
same as that to the first question. On the fourth question of how are government institutions 
instrumental, two interpretations are necessary. On the one hand, in both short-term (two-year 
non-overlapping intervals) and long-run (full data), formal institutions increase the efficacy of 
Main IP laws and Multilateral treaties. On the other hand, in the absence of formal 
institutions, the efficacy of Main IP laws seems to be greater than that of Multilateral treaties. 
Policy implications, caveats and a future research direction have been discussed.  
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Appendices 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean  S.D  Min Max Obser. 
       
Dependent  Variable Piracy rate 2.745 1.857 0.000 5.250 121 
       
 
 
Independent  Variables  
Main IP law 2.256 2.835 0.000 11.000 121 
IPRs law 1.438 1.944 0.000 7.000 121 
WIPO Treaties  2.735 0.793 2.000 4.000 121 
Multilateral Treaties 9.628 3.304 4.000 17.00 121 
Bilateral Treaties  0.322 0.535 0.000 2.000 121 
       
 
 
Instrumental Variables  
Control of Corruption -0.309 0.641 -1.236 1.086 110 
Rule of Law -0.302 0.687 -1.657 1.053 110 
Regulation Quality -0.180 0.547 -1.305 0.905 110 
Government Effectiveness -0.164 0.583 -1.038 0.807 100 
Voice & Accountability -0.277 0.69 -1.256 1.047 110 
Political Stability (No violence) -0.393 0.842 -2.094 0.996 110 
       
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Zambia.  
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations.  
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation matrix  
             
Piracy  
rate 
IP Independent variables Government Quality Instrumental variables   
MIPL IPRL WIPO Multi Bilat CC RL RQ GE VA PolS  
1.000 -0.715 -0.017 0.320 0.026 0.015 -0.432 -0.508 -0.602 -0.609 -0.420 -0.291 Piracy 
 1.000 0.103 -0.273 -0.221 -0.071 0.232 0.100 0.293 0.438 0.294 0.014 MIPL 
  1.000 0.308 0.443 0.143 0.196 0.121 0.087 0.285 -0.025 0.016 IPRL 
   1.000 0.311 -0.052 -0.094 -0.128 -0.094 -0.101 -0.098 -0.222 WIPO 
    1.000 0.261 -0.263 -0.069 -0.154 -0.129 -0.201 -0.149 Multi 
     1.000 -0.242 -0.145 -0.284 -0.328 -0.612 -0.180 Bilat 
      1.000 0.902 0.867 0.942 0.796 0.779 CC 
       1.000 0.871 0.886 0.727 0.828 RL 
        1.000 0.931 0.846 0.764 RQ 
         1.000 0.833 0.712 GE 
          1.000 0.722 VA 
           1.000 PolS 
MIPL: Main Intellectual Property Rights. IPRL: Intellectual Property Rights Law. WIPO: WIPO Treaties. Multi: Multilateral Treaties. Bilat: 
Bilateral Treaties. CC: Control of Corruption. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. VA: Voice & 
Accountability. PolS: Political Stability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Appendix 3: Variable definitions 
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Piracy  Piracy  Logarithm Piracy rate (annual %) BSA 
    
Main IP law  MIPL Main Intellectual Property Law WIPO 
    
IPRs law IPRL Intellectual Property Rights Law WIPO 
    
WIPO Treaties  WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization  Treaties  WIPO 
    
Multilateral Treaties  Multi Multilateral  IP Treaties  WIPO 
    
Bilateral Treaties  Bilat Bilateral  IP Treaties WIPO 
    
Control of Corruption CC Control of Corruption (estimate):Captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests. 
WDI (World Bank) 
    
Rule of Law RL Rule of Law(estimate): Captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
WDI (World Bank) 
    
Regulation Quality  RQ Regulation Quality (estimate): Measured as the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development.  
WDI (World Bank) 
    
Government Effectiveness  GE Government Effectiveness(estimate): Measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments 
commitments to such policies 
WDI (World Bank) 
    
Voice & Accountability  VA Voice and Accountability (estimate): Measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media.  
WDI (World Bank) 
    
Political Stability PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate): Measured as  
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional 
and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism.  
WDI (World Bank) 
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  BSA: Business Software Alliance. Log: Logarithm. WIPO: World Intellectual Property 
Organization. IP: Intellectual Property.  
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